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Abstract
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the computational study of economies
modelled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. Thus, ACE is a spe-
cialization to economics of the basic complex adaptive systems paradigm. This paper
outlines the main objectives and defining characteristics of the ACE methodology,
and discusses several active research areas.
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1 Introduction
Decentralized market economies are complex adaptive systems, consisting of
large numbers of adaptive agents involved in parallel local interactions. These
local interactions give rise to macroeconomic regularities such as shared market
protocols and behavioral norms which in turn feed back into the determination
of local interactions. The result is a complicated dynamic system of recurrent
causal chains connecting individual behaviors, interaction networks, and social
welfare outcomes.
This intricate two-way feedback between microstructure and macrostructure
has been recognized within economics for a very long time. Nevertheless, for
much of this time economists have lacked the means to model this feedback
quantitatively in its full dynamic complexity. The most salient characteristic of
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traditional quantitative economic models supported by microfoundations has
been their top-down construction. Heavy reliance is placed on extraneous coor-
dination devices such as fixed decision rules, common knowledge assumptions,
representative agents, and imposed market equilibrium constraints. Face-to-
face personal interactions typically play no role or appear in the form of tightly
constrained and stylized game interactions. In short, agents in these models
have had little room to breathe.
Slowly but surely, however, advances in modeling tools have been enlarging the
possibility set for economists (e.g., [1,8]). Researchers can now quantitatively
model a wide variety of complex phenomena associated with decentralized
market economies, such as inductive learning, imperfect competition, trade
network formation, and the open-ended co-evolution of individual behaviors
and economic institutions.
One branch of this work has come to be known as agent-based computational
economics (ACE), the computational study of economies modeled as evolving
systems of autonomous interacting agents. 1 ACE researchers generally rely
on computational laboratories to study the evolution of decentralized market
economies under controlled experimental conditions.
As in a culture-dish laboratory experiment, the ACE modeller starts by con-
structing an economy with an initial population of agents. These agents in-
clude both economic agents and agents representing various other social and
environmental phenomena. The ACE modeler specifies the initial state of the
economy by specifying the initial attributes of the agents. The initial attributes
of an agent might include type characteristics, internalized behavioral norms,
internal modes of behavior (including modes of communication and learning),
and internally stored information about itself and other agents. The econ-
omy then evolves over time without further intervention from the modeller.
All events that subsequently occur must arise from the historical time-line
of agent-agent interactions. No extraneous coordination devices are permit-
ted. For example, no resort can be made to the off-line determination and
imposition of market-clearing prices through fixed point calculations.
2 ACE Research Areas
Three special ACE journal issues have recently appeared that include a di-
verse sampling of current ACE research [17–19]. The topics addressed in these
issues roughly divide into eight research areas: (i) Learning and the embodied
1 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for extensive resources related
to the ACE methodology.
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mind; (ii) evolution of behavioral norms; (iii) bottom-up modeling of market
processes; (iv) formation of economic networks; (v) modelling of organiza-
tions; (vi) design of computational agents for automated markets; (vii) paral-
lel experiments with real and computational agents; and (viii) building ACE
computational laboratories. 2
The major issue driving research area (i) is how to model the minds of the
computational agents who populate ACE frameworks. Should these minds be
viewed as logic machines with appended data filing cabinets, the traditional
artificial intelligence viewpoint? Or should they instead be viewed as con-
trollers for embodied activity, as advocated by evolutionary psychologists? If
the focus of an ACE study is the design of a fully automated market, there is
no particular reason why the minds of the computational agents should have
to mimic those of real people – indeed, this could be positively detrimental to
good market performance. On the other hand, if the focus is on the model-
ing of an economic process with human participants, then mimicry might be
essential to ensure predictive content.
Aware of these concerns, ACE researchers are increasingly moving away from
the unconsidered adoption of off-the-shelf learning algorithms. Some ACE re-
searchers are systematically investigating the performance of alternative learn-
ing algorithms in various economic decision contexts (e.g., [3,21]). Others are
attempting to calibrate their learning algorithms to empirical decision-making
data (e.g., [13,14]). Another interesting development is the use of human-
subject experimental data to calibrate the learning of computational agents
(e.g., [6]).
An interesting related learning issue being addressed by ACE researchers is
the extent to which the learning processes of real-world market participants
are mal-adapted to market institutions, leaving room for improvement from
the application of optimization tools [11]. Conversely, to what extent have
existing market protocols evolved or been designed to avoid the need for any
great rationality on the part of market participants [10]?
An important issue for the evolution of behavioral norms is how mutual coop-
eration manages to evolve among economic agents even when cheating reaps
immediate gains and binding commitments are not possible [2]. What roles do
reputation, trust, reciprocity, retaliation, spitefulness, and punishment play?
More generally, how do exchange customs and other behavioral norms impor-
tant for economic processes come to be established, and how stable are these
norms over time? Are these behavioral norms diffusing across traditional polit-
ical and cultural boundaries, resulting in an increasingly homogeneous global
economy?
2 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aapplic.htm for pointers to resources
for each research area.
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As detailed in [9], the evolution of behavioral norms has been studied us-
ing classical game theory. In the latter, the approach has been to explain
this evolution on the basis of individual rationality considerations, such as
anticipations of future reciprocity. In contrast, many ACE researchers (e.g.,
[7,9]) have tended to place equal or greater stress on peer emulation, parental
mimicry, and other socialization forces thought to underly the transmission of
culture.
A key issue driving ACE market studies is the evolution or design of market
protocols and other market-related institutions. Many of the articles included
in the special ACE issues [18] and [19] lie in this research area. Types of mar-
kets studied include financial, electricity, labor, agricultural, entertainment,
retail, business-to-business, and automated Internet auctions.
A challenging issue motivating ACE research in the area of economic network
formation is the manner in which economic interaction networks are deter-
mined through deliberative choice of partners as well as by chance. A key
concern has been the emergence of trade networks among collections of buy-
ers and sellers who determine their trade partners adaptively, on the basis
of past experiences with these partners. Recent research on the endogenous
formation of trade networks has tended to focus more concretely on specific
types of markets (e.g., [12,16]).
Another important issue driving this research area is the extent to which inter-
action networks are important for predicting market outcomes. If interaction
effects are weak, as in some types of auction markets [10], then the structural
aspects of the market (e.g., numbers of buyers and sellers, costs, capacities) will
be the primary determinants of market outcomes. In this case, given a particu-
lar market structure treatment, multiple trial runs should result in a relatively
simple central-tendency outcome distribution. If interaction effects are strong,
as in labor markets [16], then each market structure treatment might instead
map under multiple trial runs into a spectral outcome distribution with out-
comes clustered around two or more distinct “attractors” corresponding to
distinct interaction networks.
The main questions traditionally driving the study of organizations have been
normative: How to determine the optimal form of organization for achieving
specified goals? More generally, what is the relationship between environmen-
tal properties, organization structure, and organization performance? As illus-
trated by [4], the increased use of ACE modelling in this research area might
ultimately permit a significant widening of this traditional scope by permitting
the quantitative study of multiple organizations within broader economic set-
tings, e.g., the study of intra-firm organization for multiple firms participating
within a market.
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To date, much of the work on computational agent design for automated
markets has been driven by the quest for optimal performance. Nevertheless,
some studies are taking a broader tact, focusing instead on the increasing
ubiquity of artificial life forms that this trend toward automation entails and
on some of the concerns this trend raises (e.g., [11]).
The attempts by ACE researchers to conduct parallel experiments with real
and computational agents has raised a number of challenging issues. Chief
among these is the need to make the parallel experiments truly parallel, so
that comparisons are meaningful and lead to robust insights.
One major hurdle is the need to ensure that the salient aspects of an exper-
imental design as perceived by the human participants are captured in the
initial conditions specified for the computational agents. Another major hur-
dle is that experiments run with human participants generally have to be kept
short, both to prevent boredom among the participants and to prevent the
bankruptcy of the investigators who provide the participants with monetary
payments. Thus, the “shadow of the past” might be strongly affecting exper-
imental outcomes for individual human participants in ways not understood
and controlled for by investigators. In contrast, experiments with computa-
tional agents can be run for many generations to diminish dependence on
initial conditions.
An important question, then, is which type of horizon – short run or long run
– provides the best approximation for real-world economic processes. Do real-
world economic agents essentially move from one new economic situation to
the next, never having a chance to settle into long-run behavior? Or do these
agents participate repeatedly in economic situations with enough similarity
that they are able to use long-run learned (or inherited) behaviors to deal
effectively with these situations?
A computational laboratory (CL) is a framework that permits the study of
systems of multiple interacting agents by means of controlled and replica-
ble computational experiments [5,15]. 3 A number of issues arise for ACE
researchers wishing to build computational laboratories. For example, should
a separate CL be constructed for each application, or should researchers strive
for general multi-faceted platforms? How can experimental findings be effec-
tively communicated to other researchers by means of descriptive statistics
and graphical visualizations without information overload? How might these
findings be validated by comparisons with data obtained from other sources?
A particularly important unresolved issue is the need to ensure that findings
from ACE experiments reflect fundamental aspects of a considered problem
3 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/acecode.htm for pointers to a wide va-
riety of CLs, authoring tools, and general programming languages that are currently
being used to design and/or test multi-agent systems.
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and not simply the peculiarities of the particular CL or programming language
used to implement the experiments.
3 Concluding Remarks
The defining characteristic of ACE model economies is their constructive
grounding in the interactions of autonomous adaptive agents, broadly defined
to include economic, social, and environmental entities. The state of an ACE
model economy at each point in time is given by the internal attributes of the
individual agents that currently populate the economy. These kinds of state
descriptions will presumably have direct meaning for economists and other
social scientists, thus increasing the transparency and clarity of the modelling
process.
The use of ACE model economies might also facilitate the development and
experimental testing of integrated theories that build on theory and data from
many different fields of social science. In particular, ACE frameworks could
encourage economists to address growth, distribution, and welfare issues in a
more comprehensive manner embracing a variety of economic, social, political,
and psychological factors, thus restoring the broad vision of early political
economists.
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